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.
IMPLICATIONS OF BUCKHANNON BOARD AND CARE 
HOME) INCORPORATED V. WEST VIRGINIA 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN RESOURCES1 
FOR DUE PROCESS UNDER THE INDIVIDUALS WITH 
DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On May 29, 2001, the United States Supreme Court decided 
Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Incorporated v. West Vir-
ginia Department of Health and Human Resources. In yet an-
other 5-4 split, a the Court determined that for purposes of fee-
shifting statutes such as the Fair Housing Amendments Act 4 
and the Americans with Disabilities Act,~ a party must now se-
cure an enforceable judgment or a court-ordered consent decree 
to recover attorneys' fees as the "prevailing party." A defen-
dant's voluntary change after a suit is filed is no longer enough 
to recover as it "lacks the necessary imprimatur on the 
h ,6 c ange. 
"Numerous federal statutes allow courts to award attor-
neys' fees and costs to the 'prevailing party."'7 And, tradition-
ally, courts have held that simply being the catalyst to change 
was enough to be deemed a "prevailing party" under the cata-
lyst theory. 
Critics of the Buckhannon decision argue that the ruling 
"doesn't offer much assistance to civil rights lawyers."8 These 
1. 5:~2 U.S. 59R, 121 S. Ct. 1R35 (2001). 
2. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. (West 2001). 
:1. "In all, one-third of the term's cases (26 of 79) ended in 5-4 rulings. Washing-
ton, D.C., lawyer Thomas Goldstein, who tracks the statistics, says this is the highest 
percentage of fi-4 rulings in more than a decade." David G. Savage, United They Sit, 
ABA .Tournai :14, :14 (Sept. 2001). 
4. 42 U.S.C. § :l60l et seq. (West 2001). 
5. 42 U .S.C. § J 21 01 et seq. (West 200 I). 
6. Buckhannon, 121 S. Ct. at 1810. 
7. Jd. at 18:-Js. 
R. Margaret Sanner & Carl Tobias, Shifting Winds: Court Whittles Away at 
333 
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critics believe that the decision "will frustrate plaintiffs' efforts 
to recover attorney fees in litigation seeking to vindicate impor-
tant societal values, such as the prevention of discrimination."9 
While no federal due process cases show definite implica-
tions of Buckhannon under the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act (IDEA), a federal fee-shifting statute, there are 
inevitable consequences for school districts in suits filed 
against them under IDEA Glimpses of such consequences can 
be seen in the two Buckhannon citing IDEA cases: J.S. & M.S. 
v. Ramapo Central School Districti0 and Jose v. Joliet Town-
ship High School District 204. II 
This paper examines the Buckhannon decision, the history 
of attorneys' fees legislation pursuant to IDEA, and the appli-
cation of Buckhannon to IDEA It concludes that the Court's 
decision in Buckhannon will result in fewer out of court settle-
ments and increased litigation for American school districts 
under IDEA 
II. BUCKHANNON BOARD AND CARE HOME.', INCORPORATED V. 
WEST VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 
RESOURCES 
A. Background Facts 
Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc. (Buckhannon), op-
erator of assisted living homes, failed an inspection with the 
West Virginia Office of the State Fire Marshal for violating 
\Vest Virginia Code, sections 16-5H-1 and 16-5H-2.12 These 
statutes required "that all residents of residential board and 
care homes be capable of 'self-preservation,' or capable of mov-
ing themselves 'from situations involving imminent danger, 
such as fire."' 1:3 On October 28, 1997, after receiving a cease and 
desist order that required closure of Buckhannon's board and 
care facilities within 30 days, Buckhannon filed suit in the 
Northern District of West Virginia against the state of West 
Plaintiffs' Recovery for Attorneys' Fees, 87 ABA J. cl9, :-!9 (Sept. 2001). 
9. !d. 
1 o. H>5 F. Supr. 2d 570 (2001). 
11. 2001 WL 10007~H (2001). 
12. (Hhl8). 
U. Buckhannon, J 21 S. Ct. at 18:{H (quoting W.Va. Code§§ 16-5H-1, l6-5H-2). 
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Virginia, two of its agencies, and eighteen individuals on behalf 
of itself and other similar board and care facilities. Buckhan-
non sought declaratory and injunctive relief claiming that the 
"self-preservation" requirement of West Virginia law violated 
the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (FHAA) 14 and the 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). 1" 
The District Court granted the Respondents' motion to dis-
miss the case as moot after the West Virginia Legislature suc-
cessfully passed two bills eliminating the "self-preservation re-
quirement." The court found "that the 1998 legislation had 
eliminated the allegedly offensive provisions and that there 
was no indication that the West Virginia Legislature would re-
peal the amendments." 16 
Buckhannon requested attorneys' fees as the "prevailing 
party" in the suit and asserted that it was entitled to such fees 
under the "catalyst theory." The "catalyst theory" rests on the 
idea that a plaintiff is a "prevailing party" where it is able to 
achieve its desired result through a lawsuit which brings about 
a voluntary change in the defendant's conduct. 17 Given the 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals had rejected the "catalyst the-
ory" in S-1 and S-2 u. State Board of Education of North Caro-
lina, 18 the District Court denied the motion for attorneys' fees, 
and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The United States Supreme 
C d . . 19 ourt gran te cerboran. 
B. Issue and Holding 
By granting certiorari in Buckhannon, the Supreme Court 
set out to resolve the disagreement between the Courts of Ap-
peals20 on accepting the "catalyst theory," and whether the 
14. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. 
15. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. 
16. Buckhannon, 121 S. Ct. at 1838. 
17. ld. at 1838, 183~). 
18. 21 F.:ld 49 (1994). 
19. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. u. W. Va. Dept. of llealth & Human Re· 
.•ources, 5:-lO U.S. 1304 (2000). 
20. At that time, the Courts of Appeals were split with the First, Second, Third, 
Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits recognizing and upholding 
the "catalyst theory." See, e.g. Stanton u. S. Berkshire Regl. Sch. Dist., 197 F.3d 574, 
577, n. 2 (1st Cir. 1999); Marbley v. Bane, 57 F.3d 224, 234 (2d Cir. 1995); Baumgartner 
v. Harrisburg Hous. Auth., 21 F3d 541, 546-550 (:ld Cir. 1996); Payne v. Bd. of Educ. 88 
F.3d 392, :397 (6th Cir. 1996); Zinn v. Shalala 35 F.3d 273, 276 (7th Cir. 1994); Little 
Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulashi City Sch. Dist., #1, 17 F.ad 260, 26:3 n. 2 (8th Cir.1994); 
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term "prevailing party" "includes a party that has failed to se-
cure a judgment on the merits or a court-ordered consent de-
cree but has nonetheless achieved the desired result because 
the lawsuit brought about a voluntary change in the defen-
d t ' d t ,21 an s con uc. 
The Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, rejecting the "catalyst theory," and held that in order 
to award attorneys' fees under a fee-shifting statute like the 
FHAA or ADA, a "prevailing party" must be "a party in whose 
favor a judgment is rendered, regardless of the amount of dam-
ages awarded ... also termed successful party."22 Therefore, a 
"prevailing party" must obtain a judgment on the merits or a 
consent decree. The Court noted that "a consent decree does 
not always include an admission of liability by the defendant," 
nor does the plaintiff have to recover damages. 23 The key is 
that both a consent decree and a judgment on the merits are a 
"court-ordered 'change in the legal relationship between the 
plaintiff and the defendant."'24 On the other hand, private set-
tlements do not "entail the judicial approval and oversight in-
volved in consent decrees. And federal jurisdiction to enforce a 
private contractual settlement will often be lacking unless the 
terms of the agreement are incorporated into the order of dis-
. l ,25 
mlSSa. 
The Court reasoned that to allow recovery under the "cata-
lyst theory" would allow an award of attorneys' fees "where 
there is not judicially sanctioned change in the legal relation-
ship of the parties .... A defendant's voluntary change in con-
duct, although perhaps accomplishing what the plaintiff sought 
to achieve by the lawsuit, lacks the necessary judicial imprima-
Kilgour v. Pasadena 5;J F.3d 1007, 1010 (9th Cir. 1995); Beard u. Teska :31 F.3rl 942, 
951-952 (lOth Cir. HJ94); Morris u. West Palm Beach 194 F.3d 1203, 1207 (11th Cir. 
1999). 
21. Buckhannon, 121 S. Ct. at I 8:38. 
22. Buckhannon, 121 S. Ct. at 1839 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1145 (7th ed. 
HJ99)). It is interesting to note that .Justices Scalia and Thomas, who both concurred 
with the m;:Uority in Buckhannon, rely heavily on dictionaries to define terms in the 
opinions they write. However, there is no "otlicial" dictionary of the Supreme Court and 
many different ones are used. Samuel A. Thumma & ,Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, The Lexi-
con Remains a Fortress: An Update 5 Green Bag 51, 52 & 54 (Autumn 200 l). 
23. Buckhannon, 121 S. Ct. at 1840. 
24. ld. (quoting Tex. St. Teachers Assoc. v. Garland lndep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 
782, 792 (1989)). 
25. ld. at 1840, n. 7; see also Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 US 375 
(1994). 
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26 turon the change." 
The Court felt that it was premature to say that without 
the "catalyst theory", defendants would work to unilaterally 
moot an action before judgment to avoid attorneys' fees. On the 
contrary, the Court insisted that the "catalyst theory" creates a 
disincentive for defendants to change their behavior which 
may, in fact, be illegal.27 
C. The Dissent 
Justice Ginsburg's dissent repeatedly referred to the prece-
dent set by Federal Circuit Courts upholding and applying the 
"catalyst theory" to fee-shifting statutes. 28 She noted that "the 
'catalyst rule' ... is a key component of the fee-shifting statutes 
Congress adopted to advance enforcement of civil rights. Noth-
ing in history, precedent, or plain English warrants the anemic 
construction of the term 'prevailing party' as imposed by the 
29 Court." In fact, prior to 1994, every Federal Court of Appeals 
(except the Federal Circuit, which had not yet addressed the 
issue) had held that a plaintiff in a situation like Buckhannon's 
and his patients could obtain attorneys' fees if their suit was 
the "catalyst" for the change they sought, regardless of whether 
they obtained a judgment or consent decree. In 1994, the 
Fourth Circuit strayed from the pack and decided in an en bane 
ruling that a party had to have an enforceable decree or 
agreement to prevail in a fee-shifting suit.:10 
Ginsburg claimed that the Court's decision will allow a de-
fendant "to escape a statutory obligation to pay a plaintiffs 
counsel fees, even though the suit's merit led the defendant to 
abandon the fray, to switch rather than fight on, to accord the 
plaintiff sooner rather than later the principle redress sought 
in the complaint."81 
Justice Ginsburg also took exception to the court substitut-
ing Black's Law Dictionary's definition of "prevailing party" for 
that of long-standing judicial precedent. 32 "In prior cases, we 
26. Buckhannon, 121 S. Ct. at 1840. 
27. ld. at l842-4J. 
28. ld. at 1850. 
2U. Id. 
30. /d. at 1851-52 (referring to S-1 and S-2, 21 F.3d at 51). 
:n. Jd. at 1850. 
32. Lawrence A. Frolik & Melissa C. Brown, Adv. Elderly and Disabled Client ch. 
7, 11 7.09 (2001); see c1lso Thumma, supra n. 22. 
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have not treated Black's Law Dictionary as preclusively defini-
tive; instead, we have accorded statutory terms, including legal 
'terms of art,' a contextual reading."3 ~1 
Justice Ginsburg does acknowledge that certain fee-shifting 
statutes do require court-ordered relief. However, many stat-
utes like the FHAA and ADA do not. 34 In fact, in rejecting the 
history of the "catalyst theory" pursuant to statutes like the 
FHAA and ADA, 
[t]he Court also rejected legislative history from the Civil 
Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, as sup-
port for the catalyst theory. However, the Senate Report ac-
companying§ 1988 could not have been clearer. "Parties may 
be considered to have prevailed when they vindicate rights 
through a consent judgment or without formally obtaining re-
lief." The majority did not even mention an even clearer pro-
vision from the House Report: "[A]fter a complaint is filed, a 
defendant might voluntarily cease the unlawful practice. A 
court should still award fees even though it might conclude, 
as a matte~5of equity, that no formal relief, such as injunction, is needed." 
Justice Ginsburg added that barring the "catalyst rule" may 
lead to nuisance suits in an effort to recover attorneys' fees. 
She stated, "[t]he catalyst rule provided no berth for nuisance 
suits."26 Most plaintiffs will now be reluctant to settle out of 
court. Ginsburg closed her dissent with the opinion that 
"[f]idelity to the purpose [of civil rights] calls for court-awarded 
fees when a private party's lawsuit, whether or not its settle-
ment is re~istered in court, vindicates rights Congress sought 
to secure.,. 
a3. Buckhannon, 121 S. Ct. at 185:3. 
34. Those that require a court order, howev.or, specifically state so. !d. (citing The 
Prison Lilif?ation Reform Act of 1995, 42 !J.S.C. § 1997e(d)( I )(R)(i) (19~!4 e(l., Supp. IV)). 
35. The Courts Address Golf Carts, Attorneys' Fees and Medicaid Causes of Ac-
tion, 6 Advocate (newsletter of the Nat!. Assistive Tech. Advoc. Project) 1, 5 (Summer 
2001) (av>!ilable at <http://www.nls.org/av/surnrnerOl.htm>) (quoting Buckhannon., 121 
S. Ct. >1t 1857-58). 
36. Buckhannon, 121 S. Ct. at 1859. 
37. ld. at 1861. 
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III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES 
EDUCATION ACT AS A FEE-SHIFTING STATUTE 
A. How did we get to IDEA? 
1. Public Law 94-142: The Education for All Handicapped 
Children Act 
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act3s has a sig-
nificant legislative history, beginning in 1958 with Congress' 
passage of the Expansion of Teaching in the Education of Men-
tally Retarded Children Act. :39 This Act provided federal funds 
for training teachers of the mentally retarded. 40 Then, in 1965, 
Congress passed the Elementary and Secondary Education Act 
(ESEA), 11 which was designed to improve the quality of Ameri-
can public schools and to increase and strengthen educational 
opportunities. 42 The ESEA was amended eight months later to 
include the first federal grants intended to assist state pro-
grams in educating children with disabilities in state-operated 
or state-supported schools and institutions. 43 Further amend-
ments in 1966 provided grants to local schools rather than 
state-operated schools and institutions. 44 These amendments 
also created the Bureau of Education for the Handicapped 
(BEH) to administer all Office of Education programs for dis-
abled children and the National Advisory Council, currently 
known as the National Council on Disability.15 
Federal support for education of disabled children contin-
ued as the ESEA was amended again in 1967 to expand and 
improve special education services through funding regional 
resource centers, centers and services for deaf and blind chil-
:ls. 20 lJ .S.C. § 1400 et seq. 
:39. Pub. L. No. 85-~!26, 72 Stat. 1777 (1%8). 
40. Daniel II. M<dvin II, Student Author, The Desegregation of Children with Dis-
abilities, -1-1 DePaul L. l{ev. 5~J!J, fi05 (1995). 
41. Pub. L. No. S9-10, 79 Stat. 27 (1965). 
-12. l{ichanl L. llorne, The Education o/ Children and Youth with Special Needs: 
What do the Laws Say?, #NlJJ5 NICIICY News Dig. (news digest ofthe Nat!. Info. Ctr. 
for Children and Youth with Disabilities) :l (Oct. HJ96) 
<www .n ichcy .org/puhs/newsd igest!nrl J 5txL htm>. 
-1:1. Pub. L. No. SH-:ll :l, 7!J Stat. J I fi2 (I !J65). 
44. Pub. L. No. SH-750, 80 Stat. lHJl (I!JG6). 
45. Horne, supra n. 12, at :l. 
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dren, expanded media programs, research, and a center to re-
cruit teachers and disseminate information about education for 
disabled children.46 However, the programs and services were 
discretionary, and many public schools did not take advantage 
ofthem. 47 Congress attempted to help improve the effectiveness 
of these programs in 1970 with another amendment to the 
ESEA. 48 This amendment consolidated the grant programs cre-
ated under the ESEA, and the ESEA became known as the 
Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA).49 
Congress attempted to assure safeguards against discrimi-
nation in the identification, evaluation, and placement of dis-
abled students when it passed the Education Amendments of 
1974.50 This law required states to set up a timetable for grant-
ing disabled students a full right to education. It also man-
dated integration of special education students into the general 
education classroom. However, this law had little effect on edu-
cation for the disabled because the bill lacked a program for 
funding and a real method of enforcement. 51 
Public Law 94-142, the Education for All Handicapped 
52 Children Act (EAHCA), passed on November 29, 1975, was 
the first real federal guarantee to a free and appropriate public 
education (FAPE) for disabled children ages 3 to 21.53 Under 
the EAHCA, special education gained its own life and finally 
had its own source of funding and its own specially trained 
54 teachers. The EAHCA corrected many of the problems found 
in enforcing and funding the ESEA and its amendments. States 
that received federal funds under the EAHCA had to submit a 
plan that included the state's policies and procedures for edu-
cating disabled students. It further required an explanation of 
how those policies and procedures complied with the Act. The 
plan then had to be approved by the BEH. Approval obligated 
the states, and therefore local school districts that received 
46. Pub. L. No. 90-247, 81 Stat. 783 (1967). 
47. Horne, supra n. 42, at 3. 
48. Pub. L. No. 91-230, 84 Stat. 175 (1970). 
49. Charles J. Russo, Timothy E. Morse & Marian C. Glancy, Special Education: 
A Legal History and Overuiew, 64 Sch. Bus. Affairs 8, 8 (Aug. 1998). 
50. Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88 Stat. 484 (1974). 
51. Horne, supra n. 42, at 4. 
52. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 73 (1975). 
53. Horne, supra n. 42, at 4. 
54. Sabrina Holcomb, Ed Amundson & Patti Ralabate, The New IDEA Survival 
Guide, 10 (Nat!. Educ. Assn. of the U.S. 2000). 
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state funds, to follow the provisions of the EAHCA. All states 
but New Mexico submitted a plan so they could receive federal 
funding. New Mexico soon learned, however, that under Sec-
tion 504 (discussed below), it would be required to provide a 
free, appropriate education to its disabled students regardless 
of the EAHCA."" So New Mexico submitted a plan and received 
federal funds for programs it was required to provide anyway. 56 
Rights guaranteed by the EAHCA included "fairness, ap-
propriateness, and due process in decision making about pro-
viding special education and related services to children and 
youth with disabilities."57 The EAHCA provided safeguards in 
placement and special education program decisions. School dis-
tricts could no longer refuse service to disabled students or 
force parents to place their children in special education pro-
grams of which they did not approve.58 In fact, parents could 
now sue school districts through an administrative hearing 
process for denial of their child's right to education and educa-
tional services. 
The EAHCA included specific eligibility criteria for special 
education services, which included non-discriminatory testing 
and evaluation59 and individualized education plans (IEPs).60 It 
required a free and appropriate education be provided in the 
least restrictive environment (LRE) possible.6 The LRE was 
55. N. M. Assn. for Retarded u. N.M., 678 F.2d 847 (lOth Cir. 1982). 
56. Mitchell L. Yell, David Rogers & Elisabeth Lodge Rogers, The Legal History of 
Special Education: What a Long, Strange Trip It's Been!, 19 Remedial and Spec. Educ. 
219, 225 (July/Aug. 1998). 
57. Richard A. Culatta & James R. Tompkins, Fundamentals of Special Educa· 
tion: What Euery Teacher Needs to Know 15 (Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1999). 
58. Harvey B. Polansky, The Meaning of Inclusion: Is it an Option or a Mandate?, 
60 Sch. Bus. Affairs 27, 27 (July 1994). 
59. Yell, supra n. 56, at 225. 
60. Culatta, supra n. 57, at 14. "An IEP is developed at a meeting among qualified 
school officials, the child's teacher, the child's parents or guardians, and, when appro-
priate, the child. It must include, among other things, statements of the child's present 
level of educational performance, annual goals for the child, the specific educational 
services to be provided the child, and the extent to which the child will be able to par-
ticipate in [general] education programs. School officials must convene a meeting at 
least annually to review and, when appropriate, revise the IEP. As this court has rec-
ognized, 'the IEP is more than a mere exercise in public relations. It forms the basis for 
a handicapped child's entitlement to an individualized and appropriate education.' 
Thus the importance of the development of the IEP to meet the individualized needs of 
the handicapped child cannot be underestimated." Greer v. Rome City Sch. Dist., 967 
F.2d 470 (11th Cir. 1992) affing 950 F.2d 688, 695 (11th Cir. 1991) (quoting Doe v. Ala. 
St. Dept. of Educ., 915 F.2d 651, 654 (11th Cir. 1990)). 
61. Culatta, supra n. 57, at 14; Yell, supra n. 56, at 225. 
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defined as "appropriate placement along a continuum .... This 
continuum [could] run from a self-contained, highly structured 
environment, to inclusion in a [general education] classroom. 
This placement [had to] allow the student to be educated as 
much as possible with students who [were] not disabled."r;2 The 
law also guaranteed related services such as transportation to 
and from school, speech pathology, and physical therapy. 63 
2. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Section 504 
64 The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Section 504 offered 
broader and more general legal coverage as opposed to the nar-
row, specific coverage of educational rights for the handicapped 
found in the EAHCA.65 Section 504 prevented discrimination 
against disabled people 66 in federally funded programs. 67 This 
included public education programs that were federally 
funded. 68 
Given the apparent overlap of [S]ection 504 and the EAHCA, 
[legal] actions were brought to vindicate educational rights 
under both acts. Several advantages were readily apparent in 
bringing an action under [S]ection 504 for protections that 
were also available under the EAHCA. One of the significant 
differences was that attorneys' fees were available under 
69 [S]ection 504 but not under the EAHCA. ... 
62. Polansky, supra n. 58, at 28. 
63. Bd. o{Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 187 n. 10 (1982). 
64. Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973). 
65. Thomas F. Guernsey, The Education for All Handicapped Children Act, 42 
U.S.C. §1988, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act o{1978: Statutory Interaction 
Following the Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986, 68 Neb. L. Rev. 564 
(1989). 
66. Section 504 defined a disabled person as "[a]ny person who (i) has a physical 
or men.t~l .impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major 
hfe activities, (n) has a record of such impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such 
impairment." Horne, supra n. 42, at 4. 
. 67. ~olcomb, supra n. 54, at 9. "[Nio otherwise qualified handicapped individual 
m the Umted States ... shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the 
participation in, or be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under 
any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance .... " Kathleen S 
Mon~ie, Stu?ent Author, The Right to a Special Education, 57 Mont. L. Rev. 151, 16i 
(1996) (quotmg Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat 355 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 701 
(1988 & Supp. V 1993)). · 
68. Culatta, supra n. 57, at 14. 
69. Guernsey, supra n. 65, at 567. 
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Many of these suits were brought concurrently under 42 
U.S.C. §198370 alleging deprivation of a federal right. Section 
1983 also offered the remedy of attorneys' fees. 71 
As a result, most suits alleging a violation of the EAHCA 
additionally alleged violations of Sections 504 and 1983 so that 
if the parents prevailed, they could obtain attorneys' fees. 72 
However, lower courts were split on whether the EAHCA was 
an "exclusive remedy or whether actions covered by the 
EAHCA could also be brought concurrently under Sections 
198~3 and 504." 7:1 The United States Supreme Court directly 
addressed this issue in Smith v. Robinson 74 and held that 
"Congress intended the [EAHCA] to be the exclusive avenue 
through which a plaintiff may assert an equal protection claim 
to a publicly financed special education." 75 Therefore, the 
EAHCA could not be circumvented by claims under other stat-
utes, which allowed the recovery of attorneys' fees. 76 
3. The Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986 
In 1986, Congress passed an amendment to the EAHCA: 
The Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986,77 in reac-
tion to the Supreme Court's decision in Smith. This amend-
ment allowed courts to award reasonable attorneys' fees and 
costs to parents who were prevailing parties in lawsuits 
against school districts who violate the EAHCA. 78 This 
amendment also provided a real force behind the law as school 
districts would be responsible not only for compliance with the 
law but for all costs associated with their non-compliance so 
that "the efficacy of seeing relief [no longer] hinged upon the 
ability of ... parents ... to incur litigation expenses .... "79 
This provision caused a steep rise in special education liti-
gation. Both parents and school districts were now more fre-
70. 42 U.S.C. § l!l8:J (I!J8:l). 
71. Guernstey, supra n. 65, at 567. 
72. ld. 
n. ld. at 567-68. 
74. 468 U.S. !!92 (1981). 
75. Smith, 168 U.S. at 1009. 
76. Guernsey, supra. n. 65, at 5fj8. 
77. Pub. L. No. 99-372, 100 Stat. 796 (1986). 
78. YPII, supra n. 5G, at 22G; Guernsey, supra n. G5, at 5G8. 
7!l. A. SPymour, IH, Creating Substantive Rights for Childrnt with Disabilities 3 
Georgdown .J. on Fighting Poverty un, 187 (1996). 
344 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [2002 
quently represented by attorneys in their interactions with 
each other, and the threat of losing at a due process hearing 
caused many school districts to enter into out-of-court settle-
ments. In fact, school districts still often settle cases that lack 
merit based on a cost-benefit analysis that "does not warrant 
spending public funds and dedicating administrative time nec-
1. . t ,so essary to 1hga e. 
B. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
Congress again amended the EAHCA in 199081 and 
changed the name to the Individuals with Disabilities Educa-
tion Act (IDEA). 82 There were few substantive changes to the 
law, 83 but the name change was significant because it "symbol-
ized a rejection of the patronizing attitude associated with the 
term 'handicapped' and demonstrated a renewed interest in the 
education ofthe nation's disabled citizens."84 
The small legislative changes that did occur in IDEA in-
cluded the addition of autism and traumatic brain injury as 
80. Bridget A. Flanagan & Chad ,J. Graff, Federal Mandate to Education Disabled 
Students Doesn't Cover Costs, 48 The Fed. Law. 22, 26-27 (Sept. 2000). 
81. Pub. L. No.lOl-476, lOti Stat. 1103 (1990). 
82. Monzie, supra n. 67, at 161; Horne, supra n. t12, at 5. 
83. IDEA encompassed all previous legislation and amendments meaning that it 
guaranteed the right to a free, appropriate education (FAPE) to all disabled students 
ages three to twenty-one at public expense. A free and appropriate education was to be 
given regardless of the severity of a student's disability. This education was to be based 
on a complete and individual assessment of each disabled child's needs and perform-
ance levels. An IEP was to then be written based on the outcomes of the assessment 
and was to include specific services to which the child was entitled and would receive 
in an attempt to meet the goals of the child's IEP. To the maximum extent possible, 
each disabled child was to be educated in the general education classrooms of his/her 
own neighborhood school. Disabled students had the right to receive supplemental ser-
vices like transportation to and from school and developmental, corrective, and other 
supportive services including speech therapy, speech pathology and audiology, psycho-
logical services, cmmseling (including rehabilitative), physical therapy, occupational 
therapy, therapeutic recreation, school health services, social work services in the 
school, parent counseling and training, and medical diagnosis or evaluation. 
Under IDEA, as had been guaranteed by previous legislation, parents of disabled stu-
dents had the right to be involved in the decisions surrounding their child's assess-
ment, placement, and IEP. Parents had to give consent before initial assessment could 
even take place. Parents were to be notified of any changes in their child's program(s) 
and be included in any meetings involving the writing of, or changes in, the lEP. A 
parent's signature was required on the lEP before it could be implemented. Parents 
also had the right to challenge or appeal in a due process procedure any decision made 
by the school in regard to their child's assessment, placement, IEP, or the provision of a 
free, appropriate education. Horne, supra n. 42, at 5. 
84. Monzie, supra n. 67, at 162. 
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classifications of students covered by the Act. Further changes 
included a transition plan 85 with goals to prepare the disabled 
student to transition into higher education, employment, 
and/or the community after graduation. This plan was required 
by age sixteen as an addition to the IEP.86 
By 1996, however, many students were still not being edu-
cated in the general education classroom. The United States 
Department of Education reported that only forty percent of all 
general education classrooms contained special education stu-
dents. Some states encouraged inclusion more than others. 87 
While this statistic did reflect a difference from statistics re-
ported to Congress prior to the passage of the EAHCA in 1975, 
it showed that the United States was a long way from granting 
all disabled children the right to a free, appropriate public edu-
cation with the maximum amount of time possible in a general 
education classroom. So, in 1997, Congress issued significant 
amendments to the IDEA. The result became known as IDEA 
'97.88 
The main idea of IDEA '97 mirrored research and court de-
cisions that suggested that disabled students performed better 
in the general education classroom (with supplemental aids 
and services, if necessary). 89 The largest changes made by 
IDEA '97 involved the IEP process and team.90 Discipline was 
also a significant topic added to IDEA '97.91 Significantly, IDEA 
'97 attempted to alleviate the overly adversarial system of spe-
cial education litigation by requiring states to offer mediation 
between parents and schools as a method for resolving disputes 
about IEPs and other issues related to special education as-
sessment, placement, or programming.92 Mediation could settle 
claims without having to go through a due process hearing. 
Even more telling was that the award of attorneys' fees was re-
R5. A transition plan is often called an Individualized Transition Plan or ITP. 
Rf). Horne, supra n. 42, at 5; Lilliam Rangei-Diaz, Ensuring Access to the Legal 
System for Children and Youth With Disabilities in Special Education Disputes, 27 
Human Rights 17, 18 (Wintter 2000); Yell, supra n. 56, at 226. 
R7. Kristen Girard Golomb & Peggy Ilammeken, Grappling with Inclusion Confu-
sion?, Learning 49, 4~1 (,Jan./Feb. 19~16). 
RR. Pub. L. No. 105-17, 111 Stat. 37 (19~17). 
R9. llolcomb, supra n. 51, at 10. 
90. Dixie Snow Huefner, The Risks and Opportunitie., a{ the TRP Requirements 
Under IDEA '.97, :J:l The ,J. of Spec. Educ. 195, 196 (2000). 
~Jl. Yell, supra n. 56, at 22G. 
92. Jd. 
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tained in IDEA '97. 9:1 
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF BUCKHANNON ON DUE PROCESS 
HEARINGS UNDER THE INDMDUALS WITH DISABTI,ITIES 
EDUCATION ACT. 
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Buckhannon on May 
29, 2001, numerous District Court and Court of Appeals deci-
sions since Buckhannon have applied the Court's decision to 
some of the over 200 fee-shifting statutes.!=H However, only two 
of those cases have dealt with the IDEA. 
A. Federal IDEA Law 
"As a result of the Court's opinion in Buckhannon, it is safe 
to conclude that the "catalyst theory" may no longer be applied 
in other cases involving disability legislation that use the 'pre-
vailing party' langua~e, such as ... Individuals with Disabili-
ties Education Act."9" Under the "catalyst theory," parents 
were able to file suit, mediate a settlement with a school dis-
trict, and still obtain attorneys' fees. But, Buckhannon seems to 
encourage parents to skip the mediation process unless they 
9:1. "In any action or proceeding brought under this sectiDn, the court, in its dis· 
cretion, may award reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the costs to the parents of a 
child with a disability who is the prevailing party." 20 U.S.C. 1415(i)(:1)(B) (West 2001). 
94. See Sanner, supra n. 8, at :J9. Por a list of fee-shifting statutes such as the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Title !11 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title Vll of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1.964; Privacy Protection Act of 1[)80, National Ilousing Art, Securities Ex· 
change Act of 1978, Age Discrimination in Employment Act ol 1967, de., see Marek v. 
Chesney, 473 U.S. 1, 44-50 (1985) (as cited in Buckhannon, 121 S. Ct. at 1839). The 
cases involving fee-shifting statutes which have been decided sinw Buckhannon in-
clude Burt v. County of Contra Costa, 2001 WL 11:154:33 (N.D. Cal.) (based on claims 
under Title Vll of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U .S.C. §§ 1 ~181 & 198:3); Silekis v. 
Perryman, 2001 WL 96550:1 (N.D. Ill.) (based on claims purswmt to the Equal Access to 
,Justice Act); Hispanics United v. Village of Addison, 1 G7 1<'. Supp. 962 (N.D. Ill. 2001) 
(based on claim;; for violating the FcLir llousint? Act, 12 lJ.S.C. ~~ 1~181-8:3, and the 
Equal Protection Clause); Aynes v. Space Guard Prods., Inc., 201 F.R.D. 115 (S.D. Indi-
ana 200 1) (based on violations of Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act); 
Bruce v. Wkly. World News, 2001 WL 12G6l:ll (D. Mass.) (baser! on claims under the 
Copyright Act); Sys. Mgt., Inc. v. Loiselle, 151 F. Supp. 2rl HIG) (D. Mass. 2001) (award-
ing attorneys fees under the fee-shifting provision of the Racheteer Influenced and Cor-
rupt Organizations Act); Fish v. St. Cloud State U., 2001 WL fiG7771l (D. Minn.) (grant-
ing attorneys' f(~es based on pelilion as prevailing parly under Title Vll); lleavy 
Construction Lumber, Inc. v. Intl. Bhd. oj" Teamsters, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12178 
(E.D.N.Y.) (claims for attorneys' fees under the ],abor Relations MrLnagement Act). 
95. John W. Parry, Supreme Court Rules in Martin, Penry, and nuckhannon. 
Cases, 25 Mental & Physical Disability L. J{ptr. 517, fj J H (200 I). 
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can get the agreement ordered by consent decree. Instead, par-
ents will favor going to due process hearing so that they may 
recover attorneys' fees as the "prevailing party." 
The real consequence of Buckhannon is unclear, however. 
Jose v. Joliet Township High School District 20496 demon-
strates this lack of clarity. Jose was filed with the District 
Court for the Northern District of Illinois, as a demand for at-
torneys' fees based on "prevailing party" status under the Indi-
viduals with Disabilities Education Act. 97 Defendant moved for 
a judgment on the pleadings.98 
On November 1, 2000, Plaintiffs had filed for a due process 
hearing for denial of specialized instruction. Shortly thereafter, 
the parties participated in mediation and reached an agree-
ment that was read into the record before a hearing officer. As 
a result, Jose received the educational services demanded. Soon 
thereafter, Plaintiffs filed this suit. 99 
The court held that despite the fact that no due process 
hearing being held, no evidence being presented, and no find-
ing or order by a hearing officer, the reading of the mediation 
agreement into the record before the hearing officer leaves 
open the possibility of the plaintiff being the "prevailing party" 
under the definition in Buckhannon. Therefore1 Defendant's 
motion for judgment on the pleadings was denied. 00 
The United States District Court for the Southern District 
of New York made it clear in J.S. & M.S. v. Ramapo Central 
School District that the difference between Jose and a case that 
is settled purely based on mediation or settlement negotiations 
is that the agreement in Jose was read into the hearing officer's 
record. 101 
In J.S., the District participated in three days of an admin-
istrative hearing where some evidence was presented, but the 
District agreed to the parents' demands and settled the case be-
fore the end of the hearing. The settlement agreement was 
never read into the record of the hearing officer nor was the 
hearing officer asked to render an opinion on the case. Thus the 
96. 2001 WL 10007:-!4. 
97. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.; 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(:~)(B) (West 2001) (Fee-shifting 
statute). 
9H. .Jose, 2otll WL l oon4 at 1. 
99. Td. 
I 00. Jd. at 2. 
101. .J.S. & M.S., 1G5 F. Supp. 2d at 576. 
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parents had nothing within the definition of Buckhannon that 
would allow them to be deemed a "prevailing party." The Dis-
trict Court held they were not entitled to recover attorneys' 
102 fees. 
IDEA encourages school districts to engage in mediation as 
a part of the process of resolving school or parent concerns re-
garding special education services for a child. In fact, in their 
capacities as educational agencies, states, counties, and dis-
k d . . 'l bl 103 tricts must rna e me mtwn avm a e. 
Jeffrey White, associate general counsel for the American 
Trial Lawyers Association, says "[i]ronically, [Buckhannon] 
may force some claimants into litigation rather than allow an 
informal settlement,"104 thwarting the effectiveness and pur-
pose ofiDEA '97. 
Prominent parent/special education advocates and websites 
encourage parents who settle with the school district to get the 
district to admit in writing that there has been a change in 
their relationship and to agree to paying attorneys' fees. If the 
district will not agree to this~ then the parent is encouraged to 
go to court to obtain relief. 10· Thus, Buckhannon places school 
districts in a difficult position. They must either agree to admit 
there has been a change in legal relationship and pay attor-
neys' fees or accrue the costs of going to a due process hearing 
even if they are willing to settle out of court. 
Some organizations urge parents to add a claim for dam-
ages in hopes that even if a school district changes their cur-
rent practice, there will still be a retroactive claim. 106 They 
warn that "[t]he potential impact of Buckhannon can be devas-
tating. Defendants may now have the ability to string a plain-
tiff along during the course of litigation only to unilaterally 
provide all the relief a plaintiff seeks on the eave of trial. Such 
tactics would eliminate the right to fees for all the time spent 
102. [d. 
103. 20 U .S.C.§ l115(e)(l) (West 20()1). 
104. Thomas Scarlett, Supreme Court Limits Reimbursement o{Attorney Fees Un-
der Federal Statutes, Trial 16, 16 (Aug. 1, 200 1). 
105. See e.g. Reed Martin, Could You 'Prevail' in Your Lawsuit but 'Lose' Your At· 
turney's Fees and Costs? You Need to Understand How to Deal with. a New U.S. Su-
preme Court Case, Buckhannon v. West Virginia IIHR 
<http://www.reedmartin.com/buckhannonvwestvirginiahhr.html> (accessed Sept. 17, 
2001). 
106. N atl. Assistive Tech. Advoc. Project, supra n. 35, at 6. 
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on the case."107 
The Practising Law Institute (P.L.I.), in its Handbook Se-
ries on Litigation and Administrative Law, urges attorneys 
who are working with a strong case to move forward on the 
merits. Therefore the court will not be able to prove mootness if 
a change in the relationship or defendant's conduct occurs dur-
ing the course of litigation. Otherwise, the attorney should try 
to settle with an agreement which includes attorneys' fees. 108 It 
also appears, as in Jose and J.S. & M.S., that if a settlement 
agreement is enforced by a consent decree, it too will be the ba-
sis for awarding attorneys' fees. 109 
Clearly, parents who feel their child's rights have been vio-
lated under IDEA will be more eager to go to a hearing or have 
a settlement agreement enforced by a consent decree in order 
to obtain attorneys' fees. School districts will likely volunteer to 
include attorneys' fees in the settlement agreement in ex-
change for not having the settlement agreement enforced by 
consent decree and thus avoid paying full attorneys' fees and 
the cost oflitigating that matter in court. 110 
B. State IDEA Law 
There is some speculation as to how Buckhannon will apply 
to state special education suits. 111 However, "state statutes and 
regulations must meet the federal requirements as outlined in 
[IDEA '97]."112 And state courts must comply with the decisions 
of the United States Supreme Court. Therefore, it is unlikely 
that state fee-shifting statutes will be treated any differently 
than the federal statutes upon which Buckhannon is based. 
However, state laws have yet to be amended based on Buck-
hannon, nor are there any published state hearing office deci-
sions that reflect how it will affect state fee-shifting statutes. 
107. Id. 
108. Richard A. Rothschild, Litigating Section 1988 Attorneys' Fees, 666 P.L.I. 
Litig. & Admin. Prac. Course Handbook Series 7, 12 (Oct.-Nov. 2001). 
lO!J . .Scarlett, supra n. 104, at 16. 
110. Richard Talbot Seymour, Recent Decisions on Monetary Relief, SG016 ALI-
ABA CLE, ALJ-ABA Course of Study 1081, I 140 (,July 2G-28, 20(ll) 
111. Draft Firm Letter from Miller, Brown & Dannis to Governing Board Mem-
bers, Superintendents, Student Services Directors, Special Education Directors and 
Selpa Directors Re: The United States Supreme Court Rejects the "Catalyst Theory'' as 
the Basis for Seeking Attorneys' Fees Under the ADA and FHAA (dated ,June 22, 2001; 
on file with author). 
J 12. Yell, ,;upra n. !16, at 227. 
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There are some commentators and practitioners, like Rich-
ard A. Rothschild of the Western Center on Law and Poverty, 
who believe that fees will still be available in state court. 113 He 
refers to the California Code of Civil Procedure, section 1021.5, 
which allows recovery of attorneys' fees by a successful party 
"in any action which has resulted in the enforcement of an im-
portant right affecting the public interest."114 
V. CONCLUSION 
The full effect of Buckhannon has yet to be seen, particu-
larly for IDEA. Practitioners and advocates recommend aban-
doning private settlements in special education due process 
hearings in order to preserve the right to be awarded attorneys' 
fees. Therefore, it is likely that Buckhannon will result in fewer 
out-of-court settlements and increased litigation for American 
school districts under IDEA. Parents will not be willing to me-
diate or settle without having the agreement endorsed by a 
hearing officer or court of law. Additionally, school districts will 
press for private settlements to avoid the necessity of paying 
attorneys' fees. However, in an effort to avoid the costly hear-
ing process, school districts will likely add attorneys' fees to 
their settlement agreements in hopes of settling at an amount 
closer to nuisance value rather than risk a hearing that might 
result in liability for all attorneys' fees. Surely, these view-
points in direct opposition to each other will inevitably result in 
increased involvement by attorneys on both sides. 
Jennifer R. Rowe 
113. Rothschild, supra n. 108, at 11. 
114. Cal. Civ. P. Cod"§ 1021.5 (West 2001 ). 
